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NOTES AND COMMENTS
JURISDICTION UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY
AMENDMENTS OF 1984: SUMMING UP THE
FACTORS
I. INTRODUCTION
Thirteen years after Congress first addressed the reformation of
United States bankruptcy laws, uncertainty still exists over the scope of
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.1 The apparent need to expand
that jurisdiction was a major impetus leading to the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978.2 However, the entire bankruptcy system began to unravel
in 1982, when the Supreme Court ruled in Northern Pipeline Construc-
tion Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 unconstitutionally conferred Article III judicial powers upon bank-
ruptcy judges without giving them the Axticle III-mandated protections
of life tenure and a guaranteed salary.3 The bankruptcy courts were in
legal limbo while Congress argued over whether to remove the Article
III judicial power from the bankruptcy judges or to grant them the life
tenure and protection from salary diminution required by Article III.4
1. See, eg., 130 Cong. Rea H7490 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep. Edwards ex-
pressing doubt about the constitutionality of jurisdictional powers granted to bankruptcy judges
under H.R. 5174, Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984); see infira notes 4, 34, and accompanying text
for a history of congressional debate over bankruptcy reform.
2. See generally Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, Pt. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 85 (1973); see also infra note 35.
3. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), discussed in
further detail, infra. The Constitution, in Article III § 1, states: "The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish." The Clause further stipulates: "The Judges, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, re-
ceive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1. Thus, if Congress creates an inferior court and vests in it the
"judicial power of the United States," then the judges of that court must have life tenure during good
behavior and protection from salary diminution as guarantees of the court's independence from the
other branches of government.
4. See generally H.R. REP. No. 9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983); S. REP. No. 55, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7 (1983); see also R. DEMASCIO, WM. NORTON & R. LIEB, FOURTEEN YEARS OR LIFE:
THE BANKRUPTCY COURT DILEMMA 22 (1983). The House, as it had before the 1978 Act, pro-
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After two years of debate, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Amend-
ments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, which did not give Article III
status to bankruptcy judges, but rather attempted to make the bank-
ruptcy judges constitutionally valid adjuncts of the Article III district
courtS. 5
When Congress drafted the 1984 Amendments it had to identify, in
accordance with Marathon, which fights the Constitution requires to be
adjudicated in an Article III forum. Marathon established guidelines for
two categories of rights. On one hand, the Supreme Court suggested that
Congress had some latitude in establishing tribunals other than Article
III courts to adjudicate rights which Congress had created.6 Because the
Constitution gives Congress the right to establish "uniform laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies,"7 some bankruptcy proceedings obviously in-
volve only congressionally created rights and do not require a full Arti-
cle III forum. On the other hand, the Supreme Court declared that
Article III tribunals must always retain the essential attributes of judicial
power if the adjudication involved a right not created by Congress.8
Thus, when bankruptcy proceedings only involve rights created by the
Constitution, by state law, or even by common law, jurisdiction must be
placed in an Article III court.
Marathon, however, does not address the requirements for a right
that does not fit neatly into either of the categories: the congressionally
created rights or non-congressionally created rights. What is required if
the proceeding before the court involves both basic bankruptcy rights
and rights created by the state, Constitution, or common law? The 1984
Amendments establish a new bankruptcy court system which stands as
Congress' answer to this constitutional question.
The bankruptcy system under the 1984 Amendments has several
important new jurisdictional features:
a. Bankruptcy judges are appointed by the courts of appeals to four-
teen year terms and each bankruptcy judge constitutes a unit of the
posed to extend Article III safeguards to bankruptcy judges while allowing them to retain broad
jurisdiction. The Senate voiced strong opposition to life-tenured bankruptcy judges, maintaining
that the unconstitutionally broad grant of jurisdiction could be reduced without disrupting the day-
to-day administration of the bankruptcy courts.
5. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat.
333 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C. (1984)) [hereinafter "1984
Amendments"].
6. See Marathon, 458 U.S. at 80 & n.32.
7. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
8. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 81.
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b. The district courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases and proceedings arising under title 11.10
c. The district courts have discretionary power to refer cases and pro-
ceedings within the bankruptcy jurisdiction of the district courts to the
bankruptcy judges. 11
d. In cases and proceedings referred to them, bankruptcy judges
must distinguish between core and non-core proceedings. In core pro-
ceedings, bankruptcy judges may enter dispositive orders and judg-
ments, but in non-core proceedings bankruptcy judges may only
submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district
court. 
12
e. District courts may withdraw cases or proceedings from the bank-
ruptcy judge at any time, for cause."
The history of bankruptcy jurisdiction builds a foundation for the
Supreme Court's decision in Marathon. The constitutionality of the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 depends
upon the analysis of the plurality and concurring opinions in Marathon.
As each of the jurisdictional provisions of the 1984 Amendments is ex-
plained, specific potential constitutional defects are presented. Finally, a
rationale is suggested which supports the constitutional validity of the
1984 Amendments. Lower court opinions are especially pertinent to the
development of this rationale.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION
A. Legislative Review
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to estab-
lish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States." 14 Pursuant to this authority, Congress enacted three
short-lived federal bankruptcy laws before 1898 - all in direct response
to economic depression.15 In the first law, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800,16
though there was no specific grant of jurisdiction, the federal district
courts were authorized to appoint commissioners to assist in the adminis-
9. 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152 (Supp. II 1984).
10. Id. § 1334.
11. Id. § 157(a).
12. Id. § 157(b)(1), (c)(1).
13. Id. § 157(d).
14. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
15. S. REP. No. 55, supra note 4 at 5.
16. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (1800). The 1800 law provided only for involun-
tary bankruptcy, was applicable only to traders, prescribed limited exemptions for the debtor, and
allowed a discharge of debts for honest debtors on consent of two-thirds of the creditors.
1986]
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trative functions of the bankruptcy proceedings. 7 This Act was repealed
by Congress in 1803.18
The second law, the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, continued the office of
the commissioners, but added a jurisdictional provision. It gave the fed-
eral district courts exclusive jurisdiction over matters and proceedings in
bankruptcy. In addition, it gave district courts original jurisdiction con-
current with state forums over "cases and controversies" or "suits at law
and in equity" between the assignee and adverse third parties. 19 Thus, at
an early stage, a distinction was made between proceedings on one hand,
and cases or controversies on the other. Although the Act of 1841 was
repealed by Congress in 1843,20 the words-proceedings and cases and
controversies-have become terms of art.2
During the depression following the civil war, Congress enacted the
third law, the Bankruptcy Act of 1867.22 This act changed the title of
the commissioners to registers but retained their administrative func-
tion.23 A provision of the 1867 Act conferred all bankruptcy jurisdiction
on the federal district courts.24 This Act was repealed in 1878.25
Twenty years later, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was enacted.2 6 This
17. Id. §§ 2-3, 2 Stat. 21-22 (1800). A commissioner, upon due examination, declared a party
bankrupt. Thereafter the commissioner had several powers including the power to cause the bank-
rupt to be arrested, the power to take possession of the bankrupt's property, books, and papers, the
power to admit proof of debts by the creditors, the power to assign the bankrupt's property, the
power to summon witnesses regarding concealed property, the power to void fraudulent convey-
ances, the power to order the proportional distribution of the assets of the estate to the creditors, and
the power to certify a discharge to the district judge. Id. §§ 4-16, 29-30, 36, 2 Stat. 22-26, 29-30, 31
(1800).
18. Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248 (1803).
19. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 8, 5 Stat. 440, 446 (1841). The 1841 Act provided for
voluntary bankruptcy for individuals, involuntary bankruptcy for traders, prescribed limited exemp-
tions for the debtor, and allowed a discharge to honest debtors unless a majority of creditors filed
written objections.
20. Act of March 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614 (1843).
21. 1- DEMAScIO, WM. NORTON & R. LIEB, FOURTEEN YEARS OR LIFE: THE BANKRUPTCY
COURT DILEMMA 1, 1 (1983). If a bankruptcy petition is uncontested, there are no "questions
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through
the judicial process." Id. (citing United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396
(1980)). Therefore, "proceedings" which arise in bankruptcy are matters which are uncontested by
third parties, and which are largely administrative. "Cases" and "controversies," on the other hand,
involve a "controversy between parties having adverse legal interests." Id. (citing Babbitt v. United
Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)).
22. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (1867). The 1867 Act provided for voluntary
and involuntary bankruptcy for traders and non-traders and included corporations for the first time.
23. Id. §§ 3-4, 14 Stat. 518-19. The register was authorized to take possession of the bankrupt's
property, take proof of debts, and order distribution of the estate, but he could not adjudicate any
matter in which an issue of fact or of law was raised and contested by any party.
24. Id. §§ 1-2, 14 Stat. 517-518.
25. Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99 (1878).
26. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898). The 1898 Act provided liquidation
4
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was the first bankruptcy statute which was not enacted as a response to a
depression, and it served as the law of bankruptcy for over 40 years. The
Act and its subsequent amendments represented a major change in the
concept of bankruptcy jurisdiction. The Act created the position of
bankruptcy referee. The referees were appointed for two year terms.
They were not salaried officers of the United States, but were paid on a
commission basis.27 Originally the referees performed mainly adminis-
trative functions.28 A referee's jurisdiction was limited to: (1) matters
relating to property over which he had direct control (summary jurisdic-
tion); (2) matters referred to him as a special master by the district
judge;29 or (3) matters submitted by consent of the parties. 30 While re-
taining the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal district courts over bank-
ruptcy proceedings, the 1898 Act limited the jurisdiction of the district
courts over controversies. A federal judge would have jurisdiction only if
a bankruptcy controversy satisfied the traditional diversity or federal
question criterion for federal jurisdiction.3'
Initiating a major revision of the 1898 Act, the Chandler Act of
1938 began a trend toward making the referee into a judicial officer by
placing many of his former administrative duties in the trustee and the
clerk. 32 In 1946, referees were made salaried officers of the district
courts and their terms of office were extended to six years.33 In 1973, the
Supreme Court issued the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure which re-
moved more administrative duties from the referee and changed his title
to bankruptcy judge.34 In the meantime, Congress established the Com-
mission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States to study, evaluate,
and recommend changes in the bankruptcy laws.35 In response to the
proceedings for all individuals and all corporations except municipalities, railroads, insurance com-
panies, banks, and building and loan associations.
27. See id. §§ 33-43, 30 Stat. 555-57.
28. Id. § 39, 30 Stat. 555. A referee was empowered to declare dividends, examine, amend and
record all schedules of property and lists of creditors, maintain all records of the bankruptcy in
conjunction with the court clerk, and record any evidence regarding contested matters for the judge.
29. Id. § 38, 30 Stat. 555.
30. Id. § 18(g), 30 Stat. 551.
31. Id. § 23, 30 Stat. 552.
32. Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938).
33. Act of June 28, 1946, ch. 512, §§ 2-7, 60 Stat. 323, 324-29 (1946).
34. See generally W. LAUBE & A. HERZOG, BANKRuPTcY AcT AND RULES (1975). The Rules
also conferred finality on findings of the bankruptcy judges unless the findings were "clearly errone-
ous." Id. at A-585. The rules were promulgated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1964).
35. In 1968, the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted hearings to discuss forming such a
commission. See Hearings on S.J Res. 100 Before the Subcomm. on Bankruptcy of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The Commission was then formed in 1970.
Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970). Then, in 1973, the Commission
1986]
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report of the Commission, Congress decided that an independent bank-
ruptcy court, which could decide the entire range of bankruptcy issues in
a single forum, would be advantageous.36
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, signed into law by the Presi-
dent on November 6, 1978, 3  established bankruptcy courts and made
them adjuncts of the district court in each judicial district. 38 Congress
conferred original jurisdiction on the federal district courts over all cases
and all civil proceedings arising under or related to Title 11 cases.39
However, Congress also provided that the newly established adjunct
bankruptcy courts were to exercise all such jurisdiction conferred on the
district courts.4' The bankruptcy judges were given fourteen-year
terms4" and their salaries were provided for by the Federal Salaries
Act. 42
B. Marathon
In Marathon, the Supreme Court declared the jurisdictional grant in
section 241(a) of the 1978 Act unconstitutional.43 Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. (Northern) had filed a petition for reorganization
submitted its report to Congress. Commission Report, supra note 2. Congress began debating the
issue of bankruptcy reform that year, but no conclusive action was taken until the enactment of the
1978 Act.
36. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-18, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG, &
AD. NEWS 5787, 5802-04; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 5968. Congress was particularly concerned with eliminating the "waste-
ful litigation" caused by the summary/plenary jurisdiction distinction. The jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy judge was always considered in rem jurisdiction. See B. BERNsTEIN, BANKRUPrCY
PRACTICE AFTER THE AMENDMENTs ACT OF 1984 19-20 (1984). Originally under the 1898 Act,
bankruptcy referees had exclusive jurisdiction only of property in the actual possession of the debtor.
Id. at 20. The jurisdiction was then extended to include property in the constructive possession of
the debtor. Id. at 20. Later, the jurisdiction was further extended to include property in the posse-
sion of a third party in which the debtor had an interest, if the third party's claims were merely
colorable. Id. at 20. Adverse claims regarding any other property related to the bankruptcy, such as
accounts receivable of the debtor, were determined in the district or state courts. Id. at 21. This
summary/plenary distinction caused many bankruptcy matters to be mired in jurisdictional disputes
rather than being decided in a timely manner on the merits.
37. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Act].
38. 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1978) (repealed by the 1984 Amendments, supra note 5).
39. Id. § 1471(a) (repealed by the 1984 Amendments, supra note 5).
40. Id. § 1471(c) (repealed by the 1984 Amendments, supra note 5).
41. Id. § 153(a) (repealed by the 1984 Amendments, supra note 5). The fourteen year term was
an attempt to give the equivalent of lifetime tenure to bankruptcy judges, based on the fact that the
average actual term of a lifetime tenured federal judge is fourteen years. See R. DEMASCIo, WM.
NORTON & R. LIEB, supra note 20, at 23 n.25.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 154 (1978) (repealed by the 1984 Amendments, supra note 5). See also Federal
Salaries Act of 1967, 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-361 (1982 ed. & Supp. III).
43. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 50.
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under Chapter 11 in a bankruptcy court. Subsequently, Northern filed a
suit in that same court against Marathon Pipe Line Co. (Marathon) for
breach of contract and warranty and for misrepresentation, coercion, and
duress.' Marathon responded by moving to dismiss on the ground that
the 1978 Act unconstitutionally conferred Article III judicial power
upon judges who lacked life tenure and protection against salary diminu-
tion. The bankruptcy court denied the motion to dismiss,4" but on ap-
peal, the district court overturned the decision and granted the motion.46
A majority of the Supreme Court sustained the decision of the district
court.47 The decision, however, remains controversial. Of the nine
Supreme Court Justices, four wrote separate opinions in the case.
Because there is no majority opinion in Marathon, the scope of the
ruling is a matter of widespread disagreement. The crux of the disagree-
ment lies in the applicability of the reasoning of the plurality opinion in
light of the very limited concurring opinion. In the plurality opinion,
written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
and Stevens, the justices address the broad issue of judicial independence.
The Justices of the plurality concluded that the 1978 Act violates the
Constitution's "clear institutional protections" of judicial autonomy by
providing that the newly created, non-Article III bankruptcy courts must
exercise all of the bankruptcy jurisdiction of the Article III district
courts.48 Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, in their concurring opinion,
limited their analysis to the facts of the case - a matter involving rights
which arose entirely under state law.49 Rehnquist and O'Connor none-
theless, concurred in the holding that the delegation of authority which
allowed the bankruptcy courts to adjudicate matters consisting entirely
of state rights was unconstitutional.50 The dissent of Justice White was
joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Powell. However, Chief Justice
Burger wrote a separate dissenting opinion to emphasize the limits of the
plurality and concurring opinions.51
44. Id. at 56.
45. 6 Bankr. 928 (1980).
46. 12 Bankr. 946 (D. Minn. 1981).
47. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 88, 92. Six Justices sustained the judgment of the district court, four
in the plurality opinion and two in the concurring opinion.
48. Id. at 60, 87.
49. Id. at 89-90. The lawsuit arose entirely under state law because there was no basis for
federal jurisdiction of the traditional common law claims other than the bankruptcy petition of the
plaintiff. In addition, the defendant was not a party in the bankruptcy action. Id. at 90. The plural-
ity defined a right arising entirely under state law as a state law right independent of and antecedent
to the reorganization petition. Id. at 84.
50. Id. at 91.
51. Id. at 92.
19861
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Stressing the constitutional right to have claims decided by judges
who are free from potential domination by other branches of govern-
ment, the plurality opinion stated that Article III both defines the power
and protects the independence of the judicial branch. 2 Therefore, the
plurality framed the issue as being "whether the Bankruptcy Act of 1978
violates the command of Article III that the judicial power of the United
States must be vested in courts whose judges enjoy the protections and
safeguards specified in that Article." 3
The appellants presented two arguments in an attempt to show that
the bankruptcy courts had not been given the judicial power of the
United States. The appellants contended first that because Congress is
empowered to establish Article I legislative courts whose judges need not
have life tenure, the analogous adjunct system did not encroach upon the
Article III judicial power.54 The plurality interpreted the precedents as
allowing only three narrow Article I exceptions to the constitutional
command that the judicial power of the United States must be vested in
Article III courts. These exceptions are: (1) territorial courts; (2) courts
martial; and (3) legislative courts and administrative agencies adjudicat-
ing public rights. 55 The plurality rejected a fourth possible exception suf-
ficiently broad to sustain the 1978 Amendments. Based on Palmore v.
United States,5 6 the appellants asserted that Congress could establish Ar-
ticle I courts to adjudicate cases involving a "specialized area having par-
ticularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment."57 Dismissing
the applicability to bankruptcy cases, the plurality stated that Palmore
related only to a geographic and not a subject matter area.58
Secondly, the appellants asserted that because the bankruptcy courts
were adjuncts of the Article III district courts and because appeals from
the bankruptcy courts were to Article III courts, the bankruptcy cases
52. Id. at 58 (citing United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1980)).
53. Id. at 62.
54. Id. at 63.
55. Id. at 63-72. Of these three exceptions, only the "public rights" doctrine was applicable to
bankruptcy matters. Stating that public rights must at a minimum arise "between the government
and others," the plurality recognized similarities between public rights such as the allocation of radio
frequencies or the granting of licenses or certificates and the granting of a discharge in bankruptcy.
Id. at 69, 71. However, the plurality distinguished this arguably public right of restructuring debtor-
creditor relations from the adjudication of state-created private rights such as the breach of contract
claim of Northern. Id. at 71.
56. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
57. 458 U.S. at 72-76.
58. Id. at 76. Palmore concerned the courts of the District of Columbia and the unique powers
of Congress over them. The "area" referred to therein was the geographic area of the District of
Columbia or territories outside the States of the Federal Union. Id.
[Vol. 22:167
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were, in essence, being adjudicated by Article III courts. 59 The plurality
agreed that administrative agencies and magistrates could serve as ad-
juncts to Article III courts, but emphasized that, in every instance, the
essential attributes of judicial power must be retained in the Article III
courts.6' Stating that Congress indeed had substantial discretion in es-
tablishing adjuncts of Article III courts to deal with matters of congres-
sionally created substantive federal rights, the plurality stipulated that an
adjunct dealing with rights which were not congressionally created fed-
eral rights must be subject to sufficient control by an Article III court.6 '
Specifically, the ultimate decision-making authority must remain in the
Article III court.62
The plurality concluded that the grant of jurisdiction in the 1978
Amendments did not reserve the ultimate decision-making authority in
the district courts for three primary reasons. First, the bankruptcy
courts exercised all of the jurisdiction granted to the district courts.63
This involved jurisdiction over "all civil proceedings arising under title
11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11" including matters
regarding non-congressionally created rights.' 4 Second, the bankruptcy
courts exercised the ultimate decision-making authority granted to the
district courts regarding judgments, orders, writs, and the power to pre-
side over jury trials.65  Finally, on appeal, the bankruptcy court judg-
ments were subject only to the extremely deferential clearly erroneous
standard of review, and the final judgments of the bankruptcy courts
were binding and enforceable even without an appeal to an Article III
court.6 6 The plurality examined these factors and determined that the
grant of jurisdiction to the district courts was merely a facade.67 The
ultimate repository of the entire grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction to the
district court was the bankruptcy court. In effect, the jurisdiction passed
through the district courts without leaving any visible tracks.
59. Id. at 76, 77.
60. Id. at 77-81 (citing language from Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)).
61. Id. at 80, 81.
62. Id. at 81 (language quoted from United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 683 (1980)).
63. Id. at 85 (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (1976 & Supp. 1978)).
64. Id. at 85 (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1976 & Supp. 1978)).
65. Id. at 85 (referring to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2256, 1480 and 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1976 & Supp.
1978)). This comment does not attempt to construe the 1984 Amendments regarding the power of a
bankruptcy judge to hold jury trials. For an opinion stating that a bankruptcy judge may conduct
jury trials, but jury trials would lack effectiveness in non-core proceedings, see Morse Elec. Co. v.
Logicon, Inc. (In re Morse Elec. Co.), 47 Bankr. 234 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
66. 458 U.S. at 85-86, & nn.5, 38.
67. Id. at 86 & n.39.
1986]
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The plurality refused to sever the unconstitutional grant of jurisdic-
tion to the bankruptcy courts from the presumably constitutional grant
of jurisdiction to the district court, stating that it would leave to Con-
gress the task of determining "the proper manner of restructuring" the
1978 Act.6" In order to allow Congress time to do so, the plurality
stayed its decision until October 4, 1982.69 The Supreme Court subse-
quently extended the stay until December 24, 1982,70 but refused to ex-
tend it further.71
The concurring Justices rejected the broad language of the plurality
opinion and limited their ruling to the precise claims of Northern against
Marathon. These claims would have been tried in either a state or an
Article III court in the absence of the bankruptcy proceeding. 72 The
concurring opinion did not accept the plurality's concept of the three
narrow situations in which Congress could establish Article I courts, but
focused instead on the fact that Marathon did not consent to the non-
Article III forum.73 The concurring Justices, therefore, invalidated only
"so much of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 as enables a Bankruptcy Court
to entertain and decide Northern's lawsuit over Marathon's objection."'74
The fact that Marathon had a right to an appeal in an Article III court
did not save the overly broad grant of authority to the bankruptcy
court.7 5 The concurring Justices, however, joined with the plurality be-
cause they agreed that the portion of the 1978 Act which they found
invalid was not severable from the general grant of authority to the bank-
ruptcy courts.
76
Chief Justice Burger, in his short dissenting opinion, posited that the
68. Id. at 87-88 & n.40. Noting that one of the express purposes of the 1978 Act was to ensure
adjudication of all claims in a single forum, the Justices of the plurality indicated that Congress
might want to change the entire system, including the grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction to the district
courts. Id. at n.40. The implication is that Congress would be free to establish an Article III bank-
ruptcy court.
69. Id. at 88.
70. 459 U.S. 813 (1982).
71. 459 U.S. 1094 (1982).
72. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
73. Id. at 91. The concurring Justices implied without explanation that Marathon could con-
sent to the non-Article III forum by stating, "Marathon may object to proceeding further with this
lawsuit on the grounds that if it is to be resolved by an agency of the United States, it may be
resolved only by an agency which exercises '[t]he judicial power of the United States'...." Id. at 89
(emphasis added). The clear implication of this statement is that the failure of Marathon to object to
the forum would be interpreted as Marathon's consent to the non-Article III forum. Perhaps the
implication is an indirect reference to a similar consent provision in the Federal Magistrates Act.
See infra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
74. Id. at 91.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 91-92.
[Vol. 22:167
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Court's holding was limited to the proposition that "a 'traditional' state
common-law action, not made subject to a federal rule of decision, and
related only peripherally to an adjudication of bankruptcy under federal
law must, absent the consent of the litigants, be heard by an 'Article III
court.' ",7 The Chief Justice maintained that the 1978 Act could satisfy
the Marathon standard simply by adding a provision routing ancillary
common law actions to the district courts.78
C. The Emergency Rule
As the deadline set out in Marathon approached and Congress failed
to reach a consensus, a controversy arose. If Congress did not enact new
legislation before December 24, 1982, the vesting of bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion in any court would be in question. After all, Marathon seemed to
indicate that the entire grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction - to district
courts and bankruptcy courts alike - had been struck down.79 The Ju-
dicial Conference of the United States 0 adopted the view that only the
delegation of jurisdiction from the district courts to the bankruptcy
judges was invalidated by Marathon."1 Late in 1982, the Judicial Confer-
ence requested the Director of the Administrative Office of United States
Courts to prepare a proposed emergency rule, to take effect if Congress
failed to pass any bankruptcy legislation before the Marathon deadline.8 2
The Emergency Rule was a model rule sent to the district courts,
77. Id. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger did not find any of the jurisdic-
tional provisions of the 1978 Act unconstitutional, but he wanted to clarify that the majority had
only invalidated bankruptcy court jurisdiction over rights arising entirely under state law. See supra
note 49 and accompanying text.
78. Id. This is, in essence, what the 1984 Amendments accomplish.
79. Id. at 87-88 & n.40 (Brennan, J., plurality) and at 92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The
plurality and the concurrence both indicated that the only reason for holding the entire grant of all
bankruptcy jurisdiction invalid (28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1976 & Supp. 1978)) was to provide Congress
with a tabula rasa so it could restructure the bankruptcy jurisdiction in any of several constitution-
ally valid ways.
80. For a discussion of the powers and duties of the Judicial Conference, see 28 U.S.C. § 331
(1982). The Judicial Conference of the United States is an administrative body which at the time
was made up of the chief judge and a district judge from each judicial circuit and presided over by
the Chief Justice. Id. Thus, all its members were Article III judges. The Conference meets annually
and during special sessions called by the Chief Justice to study and recommend changes and addi-
tions to the general court rules of practice and procedure. Id. The Conference submits administra-
tive "suggestions and recommendations" to "promote uniformity of management procedures" to the
various courts including the Supreme Court. Id.
81. Apparently, the position of the Judicial Conference was that only subsection (c) of § 1471
was invalidated, leaving subsections (a) and (b) intact. W. Phillips, Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Under
the 1984 Amendments 6 (Nov. 8, 1985) (unpublished manuscript). In other words, the Judicial
Conference presumed that the jurisdictional grant to the district courts was still in effect. See R.
DEMASCIO, WM. NORTON & R. LsaB, supra note 4, at 19.
82. Phillips, supra note 81, at 5. This procedure took place in spite of the fact that the Confer-
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and each locality had the option to ignore, amend, or adopt the rule."
The Emergency Rule gave the district courts power to refer jurisdiction
to the bankruptcy courts, allowing bankruptcy judges the authority to
adjudicate traditional matters of bankruptcy administration. The au-
thority of a bankruptcy judge was limited, however, in Marathon type
actions, which the Emergency Rule called "related proceedings."84 In
related proceedings, absent consent of the parties, a bankruptcy judge
could only prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
which were to be reviewed by the district judge.8"
The Emergency Rule was intended only as a stopgap mechanism. A
sunset provision stated that the Rule would be in effect only until Con-
gress acted or through March 31, 1984.86 Though slightly changed in
some localities, the Emergency Rule was applicable throughout the
United States. When confronted with the issue, some lower courts held
the Emergency Rule unconstitutional.87 However, using Marathon as a
guide, all of the courts of appeals which considered the constitutionality
of the Emergency Rule held it to be valid.88
ence had no authority for rulemaking in the bankruptcy arena and the Administrative Office had no
authority to promulgate bankruptcy rules above the simple administrative strata. Id. at 6.
83. The text of the Emergency Rule is reprinted in 1 COLLIER ON BANKR. (MB)
3.01[l][b][vi] (15th ed. 1986). The Emergency Rule is also referred to as the Model Rule or the
Local Rule.
84. Id. at 3.01[1][b][vi](d)(3)(A). The text reads:
Related proceedings are those civil proceedings that, in the absence of a petition in bank-
ruptcy, could have been brought in a district court or a state court. Related proceedings
include, but are not limited to, claims brought by the estate against parties who have not
filed claims against the estate. Related proceedings do not include: contested and uncon-
tested matters concerning the administration of the estate; allowance of and objection to
claims against the estate; counterclaims by the estate in whatever amount against persons
filing claims against the estate; orders in respect to obtaining credit; orders to turn over
property of the estate; proceedings in respect to lifting of the automatic stay; proceedings to
set aside preferences and fraudulent conveyences; proceedings to determine the dis-
chargeability of particular debts; proceedings to object to the discharge; proceedings in
respect to the confirmation of plans; orders approving the sale of property where not aris-
ing from proceedings resulting from claims brought by the estate against parties who have
not filed claims against the estate; and similar matters. A proceeding is not a related pro-
ceeding merely because the outcome will be affected by state law.
Id.
85. Id. at 3.01[1][b][vi](d)(3)(B).
86. Id. at 3.01[l][bJ[vi](h). See Phillips, supra note 81, at 6.
87. See, e.g., In re Wildman, 10 BANKR. Cr. DEC. (CRR) 668 (N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Johnson
County Gas Co., 10 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 885 (E.D. Ky. 1983); Heller & Co. v. Matlock Trailer
Corp. (In re Matlock Trailer Corp.), 27 Bankr. 311 (M.D. Tenn. 1983).
88. See North Cent. Dev. Co. v. Landmark Capital Co. (In re Landmark Capital Co.), 742 F.2d
1166 (9th Cir.), vacated, 745 F.2d 1266 (1984); National Acceptance Co. v. Price (In re Colorado
Energy Supply, Inc.), 728 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1984); Salomon v. Kaiser (In re Kaiser), 722 F.2d
1574 (2d Cir. 1983); Coastal Steel v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983); White Motor Corp. v. Citibank, 704 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1983); First
Nat'l. Bank v. Hansen (In re Hansen), 702 F.2d 728 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1208 (1983);
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 22 [1986], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol22/iss2/3
1986] BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION
D. The 1984 Amendments
While the Emergency Rule was in effect, Congress continued to de-
bate the proper way to restructure the bankruptcy system.8 9 Marathon
seemed to point to two possible but disparate courses: either the bank-
ruptcy court could be converted to an Article III court, whose judges
enjoyed life tenure and salary guarantees; or it could be made into a
bifurcated system, in which the district courts retained the judicial power
while the bankruptcy courts functioned without involving the judicial
power of the United States. The Judicial Conference and the Senate pre-
ferred a bifurcated system which would preserve the district courts as the
only "independent trial courts of general jurisdiction."9 This latter view
eventually prevailed in Congress, and the Bankruptcy Amendments of
1984 were enacted on July 10, 1984.91
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 214 (5th
Cir.), cert denied, 461 U.S. 944 (1983).
89. See supra, note 4.
90. 1982 REPORT TO CONGRESS OF JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON
NORTHERN PIPELINE CONSTR. Co. v. MARATHON PIPE LINE Co.: PROPOSALS FOR REMEDIAL
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, at 25. It is interesting to note that the 1984 Amendments draw heavily
from both the Chief Justice's dissent limiting the scope of Marathon and the Emergency Rule
promulgated by the Judicial Conference under the Chief Justice's leadership. See Marathon, 458
U.S. at 92; COLLIER, supra note 83 at 3.01[1]ib]tvi]. It has been suggested that the Chief Justice
was primarily opposed to the establishment of Article III bankruptcy courts because of his concern
over the dilution of the prestige of the district court. See R. DEMASCIo, WM. NORTON & R. LIEB,
supra note 4, at 29-30, 34.
It has also been suggested that Congress was motivated by political interests. If the bankruptcy
courts had been given Article III status, the next president would have appointed over 200 new life-
tenured federal judges. See Vihon, More on the "Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984," 8 NORTON BANKR. LAW ADVISER, 1, 1-2 (1984).
91. See Taggart, The New Bankruptcy Court System, 59 BANKR. L. J. 231, n.33 (1985). The
legislative history of the 1984 Amendments is summarized below:
April 27, 1983 Senate passes S. 1013 providing for an Article I court. 98th Cong., 1st Sess.,
129 CONG. REC. S5364 (daily ed. April 27, 1983). See S. REP. No. 55, supra note 4.
March 21, 1984 House Judiciary Committee brings H. R. S174 to the floor. Title I providing
for an Article III court is deleted and the Kastenmeir-Kindness Article I substitute is passed. 130
CONG. REC. H1853-54 (daily ed. March 21, 1984).
May 21, 1984 Senate first takes up H. R. 5174 and substantial amendments are proposed by
Senators Thurmond and Heffin. 130 CONG. REC. S6081, S6107 (daily ed. May 21, 1984).
June 19, 1984 Senate passes H. R. 5174 as amended. 130 CONG. REC. S7625 (daily ed. June
19, 1984). Bill as passed reprinted 130 CONG. REC. S8111 (daily ed. June 22, 1984).
June 29, 1984 House and Senate consider the Conference Report and pass H. R. 5174 as
amended by the Conference. 130 CONG. REC. 7471 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
July 10, 1984 President signs H. R. 5174 and it becomes Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333
(1984).
By failing to act before the deadline of the last extended transition period provided for in the
1978 Act, Congress created a constitutional problem. The terms of office of the bankruptcy judges
were held to expire on June 27, 1984, when the bankruptcy courts as construed under the 1978 Act
went out of existence. In re Thomas Carter Enter., Inc., 12 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 536, 537 (C.D.
Cal. 1984).
In the 1984 Amendments, Congress retroactively continued those bankruptcy judges in office.
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III. POTENTIAL DEFECTS IN THE 1984 AMENDMENTS
The constitutional question remaining under the current statutes is
whether the 1984 Amendments remedy the jurisdictional problems
raised in Marathon: has Congress merely constructed a more elaborate
facade of district court jurisdiction, or do the 1984 Amendments actually
replace form with substance? An understanding of the content of the
new jurisdictional provisions is essential before an analysis can be made
of their constitutionality. The grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction is con-
tained in several key sections.
A. Jurisdiction of the District Courts
Under the new section 1334, the basic jurisdiction of all bankruptcy
matters is vested in the district courts.92 This jurisdiction includes all
cases under title 11, as well as all civil proceedings arising under title 11
or arising in or related to cases under title 11. 91 The term "cases" is used
in its broadest sense, referring to the bankruptcy case which is com-
menced when a petition for relief under title 11 is filed, encompassing all
the controversies as well as all matters of administration involved in liq-
uidation or reorganization under title 11.11 The term "proceedings" is
also used in a broad sense, referring to "[a]nything that occurs within a
case," including contested and uncontested matters.95 The jurisdiction of
cases under title 11 in the district court is both original and exclusive. 96
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, § 121, Pub. L. No. 98- 353, 98 Stat.
333 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C. (1984)). But William Foley, the direc-
tor of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, took the position that such retroactive continuation
was an appointment ofjudges by Congress which violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitu-
tion, and refused to approve payment to sitting bankruptcy judges. Memorandum from William
Foley to all U.S. Court of Appeals Judges, U.S. District Court Judges, and former Bankruptcy
Judges (July 11, 1984) (unpublished manuscript). The Administrative Office authorized the reten-
tion of the judges as consultants and the Judicial Conference took steps to permit the expedited
appointment of the sitting bankruptcy judges as magistrates. Taggert, supra, at 237. Some courts
appointed consultants and others started the process of appointing magistrates. Id. After nine days
of confusion and consternation on the part of district and bankruptcy judges, Foley rescinded his
decision not to pay the bankruptcy judges, apparently upon directions from the Judicial Conference.
Memorandum of William Foley to All Judges of the United States (July 20, 1984) (unpublished
manuscript); Richard Bohannon, Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 5
(September 1984) (unpublished manuscript). At least one case has been commenced to seek a deter-
mination of this issue. Lundin v. Foley, No. 84-2237 (D.D.C. filed July 20, 1985). However, the
bankruptcy judges now sitting have been appointed by the circuit courts of appeals. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 152 (1984).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1984).
93. Id. at § 1334(b), (d).
94. COLLIER, supra note 83, at 3.01[l][c][i].
95. Id. at % 3.01[1][c][ii].
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1984).
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The district court jurisdiction of civil proceedings, however, is original
but not exclusive.97
The language of section 1334 divides civil proceedings into three
categories: (1) those arising under title 11; (2) those related to cases
under title 11; and (3) those arising in cases under title 11.98 Proceedings
arising under title 11 include any claims made under a provision of title
11. Examples include claims of exemptions under title 11, claims of dis-
crimination under title 11, or even a dispute between the debtor and the
trustee which will be settled by interpreting a provision of title 11.99 In
short, proceedings arising under title 11 are any proceedings involving
rights created by the Bankruptcy Code."
The second category is the category of proceedings related to cases
under title 11. These so-called related proceedings involve suits between
the debtor or the estate and an adverse third party which will affect the
administration of the title 11 case.'0 1 The breach of contract claim of
Northern against Marathon is one example of a related proceeding. It is
a suit by the debtor against someone not otherwise involved in the bank-
ruptcy proceeding. As one court put it, related proceedings are "those
civil proceedings, that, in the absence of bankruptcy, could have been
brought in a district or state court."'10 2
The third category, proceedings arising in title 11 cases, seems to
include every other bankruptcy matter. 0 3 If a bankruptcy proceeding
97. Id. § 1334(b). District court jurisdiction of civil proceedings is now concurrent with state
forums. This marks a distinction from the former section 1334 which gave district courts original
jurisdiction exclusive of state courts over all "matters and proceedings in bankruptcy." See 62 Stat.
931 (1948). The non-exclusive jurisdiction sets the stage for the abstention provisions found in sub-
section (C) of section 1334. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (1984).
99. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 36, at 445.
100. COLLIER, supra note 83, at 3.01[1][c][iii]. Two tests are proposed for determining
whether a proceeding arises "under" title 11. First, a case arises under title 11 if the "title or right
set up by the party may be defeated by one construction [of title 11] or sustained by the opposite
construction". See 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcTIca 0.62[2.-2](2d ed. 1984). A second test is that
"[a] suit arises under a law that creates the cause of action." See American Well Works Co. v.
Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
101. Id. at 3.01l1][c][iv]. Examples of cases involving suits between third parties are: Helena
Chemical Co. v. Manley, 12 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2d (MB) 721 (N.D. Miss. 1985) (suits by credi-
tors against guarantors); John P. Maguire & Co. v. David Rosenthal Assoc., Inc., 15 Bankr. 172
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (a suit by a factor to recover upon an account receivable); and Mazur v. United
States Air Duct Corp., 8 Bankr. 848 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (a suit by the director of an employees' benefit
fund to hold a corporate debtor's officers liable for corporate obligations). These suits were all con-
sidered related proceedings under either the 1984 Amendments or the Emergency Rule.
102. See National Acceptance Co. v. Price (In re Colo. Energy Supply, Inc.), 728 F.2d 1283,
1286 (10th Cir. 1984).
103. COLLIER, supra note 83, at I 3.01[1][c][v].
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neither arises under title 11, nor is related to a case under title 11, then it
must arise in a title 11 case."° Otherwise, the proceeding would not af-
fect the bankruptcy estate, and it would be outside the realm of title 11
jurisdiction."' 5
It is important to note that the district court has original jurisdiction
over all three categories of proceedings. 10 6 The distinctions between
types of proceedings become important, however, because only related
proceedings based on state law are subject to mandatory abstention by
the district court." 7
Subsection (c) of section 1334 allows a district court to abstain from
considering matters of state law and provides certain circumstances in
which it must abstain.'08 A district court may abstain from hearing a
particular proceeding over which it has jurisdiction "in the interest of
justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State
law."'0 9 The district courts are required to abstain from hearing any
related proceeding "based upon a State law claim or State law cause of
action" if federal court jurisdiction would not have otherwise extended to
the proceeding and "if an action is commenced, and can be timely adjudi-
cated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction."' 10 A decision to ab-
stain under the mandatory abstention clause "is not reviewable by appeal
or otherwise.""'
In subsection (d) of section 1334,112 the district courts are also given
exclusive jurisdiction over all property of the debtor. This exclusive juris-
diction applies to all property of the debtor as of the date the debtor files
under title 11 and to all property which the estate may acquire after the
filing of the petition. '" It also applies to all cases under title 11, whether
104. Id.
105. Id. at § 3.01[1][c][vi].
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1984).
107. Id. Also see infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. The distinctions are also important
in discerning the difference between core and non-core proceedings. See infra notes 132-40, 185-99
and accompanying text.
108. Id. § 1334(c).
109. Id. § 1334(c)(1).
110. Id. § 1334(c)(2). This provision was inserted to ensure that Article III district judges do
not assert jurisdiction of purely state-created causes unless diversity jurisdiction exists. See Analysis
of Proposed Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 601,
603.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (1984).
112. Id. § 1334(d).
113. Id. This is significant because it is the first statutory reference to including after-acquired
property under bankruptcy jurisdiction. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e) (1978) (repealed by the 1984
Amendments, supra note 5).
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they are petitions for liquidation or for reorganization.114
The jurisdiction granted to the district courts in section 1334 closely
follows the jurisdiction granted to the district courts in former section
1471, with one major distinction. Unlike former section 1471, the new
provision omits any reference to the bankruptcy courts exercising the
jurisdiction of the district courts.115 In fact, the section omits any refer-
ence to the bankruptcy courts at all. Standing alone, section 1334 clearly
vests all bankruptcy jurisdiction in Article III courts, pursuant to the
mandate of Marathon. However, section 1334 must be read in conjunc-
tion with other sections of the 1984 Amendments in order to assess the
constitutionality of the jurisdiction now exercised by the bankruptcy
judges. 116
B. Establishment and Authority of Bankruptcy Courts
1. Establishment
The 1984 Amendments provide in section 151 that the bankruptcy
judges are to be known as the bankruptcy court." 7 The bankruptcy
court is a unit of the district court and the bankruptcy judge is a judicial
officer of the district court." 8 Section 152 provides that the bankruptcy
judge is appointed by the United States circuit courts of appeals for a
fourteen year term.119 Section 153 provides that the salary of a bank-
ruptcy judge will be determined by the Federal Salary Act of 1967.120
District courts have the discretionary power under section 157 to
refer any or all bankruptcy cases or proceedings to the bankruptcy
courts, but the powers of the bankruptcy judges are limited.12 If a refer-
ence has been made by a district court, a bankruptcy judge may hear and
make final determination in all cases under title 11, in all core proceed-
ings arising under title 11, and in all matters "arising in a case under title
114. COLLIER, supra note 83, at 3.01[1][c][vii].
115. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1984) with 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1978) (repealed by 1984 Amend-
ments, supra note 5).
116. See, eg., 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-53, 157, 158 (1984) (discussed infra). As each of the pertinent
sections are explained, relevant Constitutional problems are examined. However, these problems are
rebutted in the final section of the comment.
117. Id. § 151. Members of Congress seemed to confuse the concept of an Article I court with
the concept of an adjunct to an Article III court. See infra note 170. However, the language of
section 151 does not establish the bankruptcy court as a court at all. "Court" is merely the term by
which the bankruptcy judge (a judicial officer of the district court) is to be known. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. § 152(a)(1).
120. Id. § 153.
121. Id. § 157(a). It is interesting to note this section is titled "Procedures" rather than "Bank-
ruptcy Court Jurisdiction." Also see infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
1986]
17
Freeman-Burney: Jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984: Summing Up
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1986
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
11," subject only to appeal. 122 In any non-core proceeding, however, the
bankruptcy judge may only submit proposed findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law to the district judge who must enter any final order or judg-
ment. 123 The section further provides that the bankruptcy judge is the
one who must determine whether the matter before him is a core or a
non-core proceeding; the involvement of state law is not, by itself, deter-
minative.124 There is one exception to a bankruptcy judge's limited au-
thority in non-core proceedings. If all the parties consent, a bankruptcy
judge can make final determinations even in non-core proceedings. 125
2. Problems with Referral
These provisions raise a number of constitutional questions. It is ob-
vious from the salary and tenure provisions that a bankruptcy judge,
though a unit of the district court, is not an Article III judge because the
judge has neither the life tenure nor salary guarantees required by the
Constitution.1 26 Yet, the district courts have the option to refer all bank-
ruptcy cases and proceedings to the bankruptcy judge. The major differ-
ence between this discretionary referral and the automatic referral
created by Congress in the invalidated section 1471(c) is merely techni-
cal. Instead of Congress granting blanket bankruptcy jurisdiction to
non-Article III courts, the judicial branch is granting some authority to
non-Article III judges to hear bankruptcy cases and proceedings. How-
ever, all district courts have issued a general reference of all title 11 cases
and proceedings to the bankruptcy judges.1 27 The effect is that bank-
ruptcy matters still pass through the district courts, although they now
leave tracks of the express written consent of the district courts.
Beyond the discretion to refer bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy
judges, two other safeguards were given to the district courts to protect
the judicial power of the district judges. A bankruptcy judge cannot
make final determination in non-core proceedings without consent of the
parties, 2 ' and the district judge may withdraw, in whole or in part, any
122. Id. § 157(b)(1).
123. Id. § 157(c)(1). This language mirrors the authority of a United States Magistrate under
the Federal Magistrates Act of 1979, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39 (Supp. 1986). See infra notes 216-21, 230-
31, and accompanying text.
124. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3) (1984).
125. Id. § 157(c)(2).
126. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
127. COLLIER, supra note 83, at 3.01[2][a]. The general reference of all bankruptcy cases and
proceedings is made automatic by rule, because the ability to withdraw the reference is available, and
because referral is revocable.
128. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) (Supp. III 1985).
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referred matter from the bankruptcy judge.129 Each of these safeguards,
however, raises its own set of problems.
3. Problems with the Core and Non-Core Distinction
Because a bankruptcy judge cannot make final determination in
non-core proceedings, at a minimum the standard of the concurring
opinion in Marathon seems to be satisfied. 130  The ultimate decision-
making authority for Marathon type cases is placed only in the Article
III district courts. However, an initial conceptual problem arises with a
bankruptcy judge's determination of the status of a proceeding as either
core or non-core. The potential constitutional infirmity is that a non-
Article III judge determines which proceedings constitutionally require
an Article III forum. As long as there is any room for interpretation in
the distinction between core and non-core proceedings, the bankruptcy
judge will be making a decision of constitutional import. It is possible
that the Supreme Court will interpret such decision-making as part of the
essential attributes of judicial power that must be reserved in an Article
III judge.131
Beyond the initial conceptual problem, perhaps the most important
constitutional question raised is the distinction between core and non-
core proceedings. It is clear that if the 1984 Amendments are to with-
stand constitutional scrutiny under the Marathon standard, the distinc-
tion between core and non-core proceedings must allow the bankruptcy
judges to determine only traditionally administrative matters and adjudi-
cate only matters involving rights which Congress has created. In all
other matters - at the very least, in matters similar to the breach of
contract claim in Marathon - the district courts must retain the judicial
power. The implication is that all Marathon type cases must fall into the
non-core proceedings category.
Section 157(b) draws the distinction between core and non-core pro-
129. Id. § 157(d).
130. 458 U.S. at 89. The concurring justices stated only that rights arising entirely under state
law could not be heard by a non-Article III judge. Id. Because non-core proceedings presumably
include all rights arising entirely under state law, and because a bankruptcy judge cannot make final
determination in non-core proceedings, the mandate seems to be satisfied.
131. 458 U.S. at 77-81. The Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, however, based on the
reasoning supra, it is conceivable that the Supreme Court would consider the act of classifying a
proceeding as core or non-core a judicial rather than an administrative act. Contra Interconnect Tel.
Serv., Inc. v. Farren, 59 Bankr. 397, 401, n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (the district judge held that the act of
classifying a proceeding as core or non-core was in itself a core bankruptcy proceeding and therefore
validly within the powers of a bankruptcy judge).
1986]
19
Freeman-Burney: Jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984: Summing Up
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1986
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22:167
ceedings by giving a non-exclusive list of core proceedings.' 32 The lan-
guage of section 157(b)(1) implies that core proceedings are those
proceedings arising under title 11 and arising in a case under title 11;
section 157(c)(1) indicates that non-core proceedings are related proceed-
ings. 133 The Marathon suit, as an action between the debtor and an ad-
verse third party, is a related proceeding. It should therefore be a non-
core proceeding.
However, related proceedings, such as the Marathon cause of action,
could be included in the laundry list of core proceedings.' 34 In addition
to the fact that the list is non-exclusive, the list contains at least two
catch-all phrases. Subsection (A) lists matters concerning the adminis-
tration of the estate as being core proceedings' 35 and subsection (0) adds
proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate and pro-
ceedings affecting the adjustment of the debtor-creditor relationship. 36
A broad interpretation of these two clauses would include every conceiv-
able bankruptcy matter, and would give the bankruptcy courts the per-
vasive jurisdiction granted in the invalidated section 1471(c). It can be
argued that even the Marathon breach of contract claim was an asset of
the estate, a chose in action, which had to be liquidated and which would
therefore fall under subsection (0) as a core proceeding.' 37
132. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (Supp. III 1985). The text reads:
(2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to -
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate; (B) allowance or disallowance of
claims against the estate or exemptions from property of the estate, and estimation of
claims or interest for the purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11 or 13 of title 11
but not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or
wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title
11; (C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate; (D)
orders in respect to obtaining credit; (E) orders to turn over property of the estate; (F)
proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences; (G) motions to terminate, annul
or modify the automatic stay; (H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent
conveyances; (1) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts; () objec-
tions to discharges; (K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens; (L)
confirmations of plans; (M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the
use of cash collateral; (N) orders approving the sale of property other than property re-
suting from claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims against
the estate; and (0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or
the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship, except
personal injury tort or wrongful death claims.
Id.
133. See Carlson, Distinguishing Core From Non-Core Proceedings, 1 NoRTON BANKR. LAW
ADVISER 1, 2 (1985).
134. King, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the BankruptcyAmendments of 1984, 38 VAND. L.
REv. 675, 687-89 (1985).
135. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1985). See also supra note 132.
136. Id. § 157(b)(2)(0).
137. King, supra note 134, at 689.
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A potential "Marathon I" case illustrates the possible overbreadth
of the specific list of core proceedings. In the hypothetical Marathon II,
assume the facts are the same as in the original case, except that Mara-
thon II has filed a claim as a creditor in Northern's bankruptcy case.
Subsection (C) of section 157(b)(2) lists a counterclaim by the estate
against persons who have filed claims against the estate as a core pro-
ceeding. 138 The rights involved in a counterclaim are not limited by any
language in the section. The breach of contract action of Northern
would no longer be a non-core related proceeding, but would be a
counterclaim falling under subsection (C) as a core proceeding. Thus,
issues identical to those in Marathon would be heard and determined by
the bankruptcy judge. 39 As long as the debtor is counterclaiming
against a creditor of the estate, the Marathon II bankruptcy judge could
make a final determination in a case involving rights which Congress did
not create. This type of determination seems clearly inconsistent with
the Marathon holding.1"
Even if a Marathon type case is determined to be non-core, the pro-
visions for review of non-core findings and conclusions of the bankruptcy
judge raise questions about the essential attributes of judicial power actu-
ally remaining with the district court. A bankruptcy judge has only the
power to submit findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district
courts regarding non-core proceedings.1 41 It has been suggested, how-
ever, that the district judge will be greatly tempted to "rubber stamp the
findings and conclusions of the bankruptcy judge" leaving the true deci-
sion-making power in the bankruptcy judge.142 There is no definition in
section 157 of the words "consider" and "review." It is presumably up
to the district judge to determine how much time and effort must go into
considering or reviewing the bankruptcy judge's proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law in any given proceeding. 143 The busy district
court dockets and the requirement that the district courts must give pri-
138. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (Supp. III 1985).
139. King, supra note 134, at 690-91.
140. Cf. Schor v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n., 740 F.2d 1262, 1268-69 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 853 (1986) (administrative law judge could not constitutionally adjudicate
state-law based counterclaim).
141. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
142. King, supra note 134, at 681.
143. Id. at 681. However, under a similar de novo review provision of the Emergency Rule it
was held that a new trial was not mandatory. The district court need only examine the record of the
bankruptcy court without giving deference to proposed findings. Id. at n.20 (citing Moody v.
Amoco Oil Co., 734 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 386 (1984)).
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ority to criminal cases 144 are two factors suggesting that the district
judges may give a very low priority to review of bankruptcy decisions. 145
If this occurs, it appears that the differences between the limited powers
given the bankruptcy courts in the 1984 Amendments and the unconsti-
tutionally broad powers given the bankruptcy courts in the 1978 Act are
merely cosmetic. 146
The consent aspect of section 157 of the 1984 Amendments 47 also
raises constitutional problems. It is hombook law that parties cannot
affect consensual jurisdiction where a court would not otherwise have
jurisdiction.1 48 Yet section 157 implies that the constitutional guarantee
of Article III jurisdiction is one that can be waived by the parties' con-
sent. 149 Further, it is not clear in the language of the section whether the
consent must be express or may be merely implied. 5 Even if the
Supreme Court were to sustain the concept of waiving a right to an Arti-
cle III forum by consent, there is a possibility that it would not allow
such an important right to be waived by implied consent."'
4. Problems of Withdrawal
As a measure of additional supervision of the non-Article III bank-
ruptcy courts by the Article III district courts, section 157(d) provides
that all matters referred to the bankruptcy court are subject to with-
drawal. 52 The withdrawal of a case or proceeding from the bankruptcy
court back to the district court may be affected by a motion of the district
court or a timely motion of any party for cause shown. 5 3 The district
court must withdraw a proceeding if its resolution requires consideration
of both title 11 and other federal laws "regulating organizations or activi-
144. See Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
145. See Brief of the Solicitor General, Marathon, 458 U.S. 50, reprinted in 56 AMER. BANKR.
L.J. 97, 108 (1982).
146. King, supra note 134, at 682.
147. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
148. See A. EHRENZWEIG, D. LOUISELL & CG. HAZARD, JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL, STATE
& FEDERAL 20 (1980).
149. 28 U.S.C. § 157 (c)(2) (1984). See also infra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
150. King, supra note 134, at 682-83 (citing Lombard-Wall Inc. v. NYC Housing Dev. Corp. (In
re Lombard-Wall Inc.) No. 82 B 11556, slip. op. (S.D.N.Y. 1985) as an example of a district court
finding consent by implication).
151. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n. v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986). The court
states that Congress may make available a "quasi-judicial mechanism" for willing parties if the non-
Article III tribunals have sufficient Article III supervision (emphasis added). Id. at 21. It would
seem that willing parties could only be identified by express consent. See also infra notes 218-21 and
accompanying text.
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ties affecting interstate commerce."' 54
This subsection raises a question of procedure rather than a specific
constitutional question. Nothing in the legislation or congressional de-
bates indicates specifically what may constitute cause.1 55 However, the
language implies that the district judge or moving party must specify a
sound reason for withdrawal. 5 6 One court has even held that it is im-
proper for a district judge sua sponte to withdraw the reference and lift
the automatic stay when no party had requested such to be done.157 It is
also unclear whether the motion to withdraw should be made in the
bankruptcy court or the district court. The entire bankruptcy case is
already in the bankruptcy court by referral, so it seems logical that any
motions involving the case would be filed in the bankruptcy court. How-
ever, it is unlikely that Congress meant for the bankruptcy court to with-
draw a proceeding from itself. Because the purpose of including a
withdrawal provision in the 1984 Amendments was to shore up the dis-
trict courts' power over the bankruptcy courts, it is more likely that Con-
gress intended that motions to withdraw be presented to the district
judge. 158
The language of the mandatory withdrawal clause is extremely
broad, 5 9 however, the legislative history of the 1984 Amendments gives
an indication that Congress intended the provision to be construed nar-
rowly.' 60 In In re White Motor Corp.,161 the district court applied the
provision by balancing the degree to which the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act'62 and the Bankruptcy Code were involved in the
154. Id.
155. King, supra note 134, at 696.
156. Id.
157. See NLT Computer Servs. Corp. v. Capital Computer Servs. Inc., 755 F.2d 1253, 1258 (6th
Cir. 1985) (case decided under Emergency Rule, but applibable to 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (Supp. III
1985).
Perhaps this can best be explained as an extention of the consent rationale: if the parties con-
sent to determination of their case in the bankruptcy forum, the district court must have a sound
reason to intervene. But see infra note 228 and accompanying text.
158. Because it is the district court which makes the referral, it is presumed that only the district
court may withdraw a case. It may be that in some instances the district court may find it useful to
obtain the bankruptcy judge's view as to whether the proceeding is core or non-core. See, e.g., In re
Morse Elec. Co., 12 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 957 (N.D. Ind. 1985); In re Pied Piper Casuals, Inc.,
12 BANIR. Cr. DEC. (CRR) 1047 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (Supp. III 1985) (second sentence). See also supra note 154 and accom-
panying text.
160. See 130 CONG. REc. 1850 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984) (Rep. Kastenmeier specifically stated
that the language is to be construed narrowly).
161. In re White Motor Corp., 11 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2D (MB) 993 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
162. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1000-1461 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985) ("ERISA"). ERISA sets minimum standards for employee benefit plans.
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resolution of the dispute.163 Concluding that the Bankruptcy Code was
the primary consideration, the court held that section 157(d) does not
require mandatory withdrawal unless resolution of the dispute requires
substantial and material consideration of federal law other than the
Bankruptcy Code.'6 It is clear that this subsection is not to be con-
strued as an escape hatch for moving bankruptcy disputes which have
been referred to the bankruptcy judge back to the district courts.1 65
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 1984 AMENDMENTS
A. Bankruptcy Judges as Adjuncts
The preliminary puzzle in analyzing the 1984 Amendments is the
status of the bankruptcy courts. The Marathon plurality opinion distin-
guished the constitutional authority of an Article I court from the per-
missible authority of an adjunct to an Article III court.1 66 The rationale
supporting Article I court authority is that controversies submitted to
these courts are not inherently or traditionally part of the judicial power
of the United States - Article I judges are not performing traditional
judicial functions. 67 To the contrary, the Supreme Court has allowed
adjunct judicial officers to perform some adjudicative functions.168 The
court reasoned that adjuncts do not exercise the judicial power of the
United States because they are subject to close control by Article III
judges.169 Therefore, the constitutionality of an Article I court depends
primarily on the subject matter before it, while the constitutional validity
of an adjunct to an Article III court depends primarily upon the suffi-
ciency of the Article III court's control.
163. In re White, 11 COLLIER BANIKR. CAS. 2D at 1007. A creditor in White's bankruptcy
proceeding had argued that because the resolution of his dispute required both consideration of title
11 and another federal law "regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce"
(ie., ERISA), the district court was required to withdraw the matter from the bankruptcy judge. Id.
at 1002-03. The court stated that consideration of a non-Code federal statute would not trigger the
mandatory withdrawal unless such consideration were necessary for the resolution of a proceeding.
Id. at 1007.
164. Id. at 1007.
165. See 130 CONG. REc. 1850, supra note 160.
166. See 458 U.S. at 80-82.
167. See Den ex. dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1856).
The Supreme Court stated that controversies which have traditionally been adjudicated in the courts
of common law, equity, or admiralty may not be removed from Article III courts to Article I courts.
168. 458 U.S. at 80. The plurality opinion states that "when Congress creates a substantive
federal right, it possesses substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in which that right may be
adjudicated - including the assignment to an adjunct of some functions historically performed by
judges." Id. (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 77-81.
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Despite some confusion in the use of terminology during the con-
gressional hearings, 170 it is clear from the language of the 1984 Amend-
ments that Congress was creating an Article III adjunct bankruptcy
system rather than an Article I bankruptcy court system.17 1 Congress
specifically called the bankruptcy judge a unit of the district court.1 72
The bankruptcy court is not established as a separate Article I court or
as an entity at all. It no longer makes sense to refer to the bankruptcy
court as a judicial forum capable of having Article I status.1 73 "Bank-
ruptcy court" is now merely a convenient term for referring to the bank-
ruptcy judge who is called a judicial officer of the Article III district
court.1 74 Thus, the concept of an adjunct system is the only reasonable
explanation for such language.
Because the new bankruptcy judges are adjuncts, the technical dif-
ference between the congressional grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy
courts in the 1978 Act and the district courts' discretionary referral of
bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy judges under the 1984 Amend-
ments is significant. Although Congress has the power to grant jurisdic-
tion to Article I courts, it does not have the power to grant authority to
Article III adjuncts. Article HI courts must have the ultimate authority
over matters which are adjudicated by their adjuncts. The attempt by
Congress to grant jurisdiction to Article III adjuncts in the 1978 Act was
unconstitutional.1 75  However, under the 1984 Amendments, Congress
has not violated the separation of powers doctrine. Congress has statuto-
rily established the office of bankruptcy judges, but the district courts
alone give these adjuncts matters to adjudicate.1 76 The United States
170. See, eg., 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 587 (comments of Sen. Dole claiming the
1984 Amendments establish an Article I court) and 590 (remarks of Sen. Hatch that under the 1984
Amendments bankruptcy judges will act as Article I adjuncts).
171. Carlson, Are the Jurisdictional Provisions of the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984 Constitu-
tional? 9 NORTON BANKR. LAW ADVISER 1, 2 (1984). The 1978 Act was also an attempt to create
an adjunct system, which failed because of the overly broad statutory grant of jurisdiction to the
adjuncts. The 1984 Amendments do not incorporate the word "adjuncts" referring instead to the
bankruptcy judges as "units" of the district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. III 1985).
172. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. III 1985).
173. Lundin, The 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments: Holes in the Matrix? 11 NORTON BANKR.
LAW ADVISER 1, 2 (1984).
174. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1984).
175. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agri. Prod. Co., 105 S. Ct. 3325, 3334-35 (1985). Speaking
for the majority, Justice O'Connor states:
The Court's holding in [Marathon] establishes only that Congress may not vest in a non-
Article III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue binding orders
in a traditional contract action arising under state law, without consent of the litigants, and
subject only to ordinary appellate review.
Id. (emphasis added).
176. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (Supp. III 1985).
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courts of appeals appoint and remove bankruptcy judges 177 and district
courts control which, if any, matters are referred to those judges. 178
Therefore, Article III courts have the ultimate authority over bank-
ruptcy adjuncts.
The jurisdictional provisions of the 1984 Amendments further sup-
port the constitutionality of the new bankruptcy adjunct system. It is
significant that Congress makes no specific jurisdictional grant to the
bankruptcy courts.179 Bankruptcy jurisdiction is granted only to the dis-
trict courts, and the mechanism for bringing bankruptcy matters before
bankruptcy judges is a purely procedural section.'8 0 The section uses no
traditional jurisdictional terms, but rather introduces the concept ofjudi-
cial referral and then limits the functions of a bankruptcy judge within
specific types of referred cases or proceedings. 181 It is important to re-
member that if the district court makes no referrals, the bankruptcy
judge will have no authority. Even if the district court makes a general
referral of bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy judge, bankruptcy juris-
diction remains in the district court at all times; no bankruptcy court has
a statutory jurisdictional grant."8 2
B. Core v. Non-Core Proceedings
The major constitutional controversy is focused upon whether Con-
gress has subjected the adjunct authority of bankruptcy judges to suffi-
cient district court supervision so that district courts retain the essential
attributes of judicial power. The question, more specifically, is whether
the 1984 Amendments properly distinguish the broad powers of an ad-
junct over congressionally created rights from the limited powers of an
adjunct over non-congressionally created rights. In making this distinc-
tion of powers, Congress introduced the concepts of core and non-core
proceedings and limited the authority of a bankruptcy judge in non-core
proceedings.
177. Id. § 152.
178. Id. § 157(a).
179. Lundin, supra note 173, at 2.
180. 28 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. III 1985). See also supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
181. Id.
182. Id. See also Firestone v. Dale Beggs & Assoc. (In re Northwest Cinema Corp.), 49 Bankr.
479 (D. Minn. 1985). The bankruptcy judge explains:
The term 'bankruptcy court' is solely a phrase that is applied to the bankruptcy judges for
a district insofar as those judges together are a unit of the district court. Thus while func-
tionally there may appear to be a separate bankruptcy court, for jurisdictional purposes
there is only one court, i.e., the district court.
Id. at 480 (citations omitted).
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The 1984 Amendments use five terms of art which differentiate be-
tween the kinds of proceedings which can be adjudicated by bankruptcy
judges and the matters which must be reserved to the district courts'
exercise of judicial power. The terms are: proceedings arising under title
11; proceedings arising in a case under title 11; proceedings related to a
case under title 11; core proceedings; and non-core proceedings.18 3 The
language of section 157 implies that all bankruptcy proceedings either
arise under title 11, arise in a case under title 11, or are related to a case
under title 11.184 Section 157 further implies that all bankruptcy pro-
ceedings are either core or non-core, 185 and lists both general and specific
descriptions of core proceedings. 186 The language suggests that all core
proceedipgs either arise under title 11 or arise in a case under title 11.187
Non-core proceedings are those proceedings which are only related to a
case under title 11.188 Bankruptcy judges can hear and determine core
cases, but only submit findings and conclusions to the district courts in
non-core proceedings. 1
89
Congress clearly intended for core proceedings, arising under title
11 or arising in a case under title 11, to include only congressionally-
created rights and non-core, related, proceedings to include all non-
congressionally created rights. This is evidenced by the fact that the
1984 Amendments allow a bankruptcy judge broad powers over core
proceedings, but limited authority over non-core proceedings. However,
the Marathon II example shows that the list of core proceedings may
include some state law rights. 190 How do the 1984 Amendments recon-
183. Lundin, supra note 173, at 2-4. Cf. Taggert,The New Bankruptcy Court System, 59 BANKR.
L.J. 231, 247-48 (1985). Judge Lundin suggests that there are problems with the interpretation of
these five terms which create gaps in a bankruptcy judge's authority. Taggert suggests that these
problems disappear if the first three categories of proceedings, arising under, arising in, and related
to, are not considered mutually exclusive, and the last two categories, core and non-core, are inter-
preted to include all bankruptcy matters. See also infra notes 191-99 and accompanying text for a
third possibility: a specific controversy may be a related proceeding at one time and a core proceed-
ing based upon its nexus to the basic bankruptcy function at another time.
184. See 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1984). This language follows the distinctions drawn in the grant of
bankruptcy jurisdiction to the district courts. Compare id. § 1334; see also supra notes 92-105 and
accompanying text.
185. See id. § 157(a), § 157(b)(1) and § 157(c)(1). This implication is drawn from the fact that
district judges may refer all bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy courts and the powers of the
bankruptcy judges to attend those matters are only defined in terms of core and non-core
proceedings.
186. Id. § 157(b)(2).
187. Id. § 157(b)(1). See also Carlson, Distinguishing Core From Non-core Proceedings, NORTON
BANKR. LAW ADVISOR 1, 2 (1985).
188. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). See also Carlson, supra note 187, at 2.
189. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b-c). See also supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
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cile a proceeding which is integral to the core bankruptcy function of
restructuring debtor-creditor rights but which also involves questions of
state law?
Based on language in Marathon, the 1984 Amendments define state
law rights arising in core proceedings as congressionally-created
rights. 191 Marathon does not allow an adjunct to adjudicate a state law
proceeding not integral to the restructuring of debtor-creditor rights.
192
But even in Marathon, it was noted that "bankruptcy adjudications
themselves, as well as the manner in which the rights of debtors and
creditors are adjusted, are matters of federal law." 93 The federal charac-
ter of a core bankruptcy proceeding is not changed by the fact that the
substantive rights being adjusted are often created by state law. Congress
made this clear by providing that "a determination that a proceeding is
not a core proceeding shall not be made solely on the basis that its resolu-
tion may be affected by state law." 194
The express purpose of bankruptcy is to modify the rights of debtors
and creditors; this involves modifying many state-created rights. Be-
cause Congress has the power to make substantive bankruptcy laws, it
also has the power to modify contractual obligations and other state-
created rights through the bankruptcy clause.1 95 When state law rights
conflict with the basic rights created by the bankruptcy code, the state
law rights are subordinate.
The Supreme Court has sustained this federalizing of state created
rights when they are adjudicated in core bankruptcy proceedings. In
Katchen v. Landy, though the Court did not use the term core proceed-
ing, it held that what would otherwise be a state action at law is trans-
formed into a federal equitable proceeding when brought as a claim in a
bankruptcy case.196 Chief Justice Burger indicated this federalizing of
state law rights in Marathon by stating that bankruptcy judges could not
determine state law rights "related only peripherally to an adjudication
of bankruptcy." 197 Impliedly, if the state law right is integrally related to
191. Carlson, supra note 187, at 4.
192. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
193. 458 U.S. at 84 & n.36.
194. 28 U.S.C. § 157(3) (1984) (second sentence).
195. See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75-76 (1982); Hanover Nat'l Bank
v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902).
196. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 336 (1966) (stating that "the bankruptcy Act, passed
pursuant to the powers given to Congress by Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution to establish uniform laws
on the subject of bankruptcy, converts the creditor's legal claim into an equitable claim to a pro rate
[sic] share of the res. . . )." Id. (emphasis added).
197. 458 U.S. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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the bankruptcy, a different standard applies. Thus, the same issue
presented as purely a state law issue takes on a different character when
it is the focus of a dispute between a debtor and a creditor in a bank-
ruptcy case.
The hypothetical Marathon 11 breach of contract counterclaim,19
as a suit between the debtor and a creditor, is subject to the fundamental
power of Congress to modify debtor-creditor relationships through the
Bankruptcy Code. The basic rights of bankruptcy are congressionally-
created rights even if they affect state law rights. As one court stated,
"core bankruptcy proceedings are matters of federal right which are
uniquely susceptible to adjudication by an adjunct."' 99
Lower court decisions have bolstered the constitutionality of the
concept of core proceedings as federal rights by narrowing the broad lan-
guage of the two catch-all descriptions of core proceedings found in sec-
tion 157(b)(2).2°° Specifically, state law contract claims that arguably
fall within the broad and general language of subsections (A) and (0) of
section 157(b)(2) have been held to be non-core related proceedings.2°0
It is neither unusual nor inappropriate for a court to resolve a perceived
internal inconsistency in a statute by giving effect to the more specific
provision when that construction is consistent with legislative intent. 2
Recognizing that judicial interpretation of statutes should avoid constitu-
tional problems,20 3 the Ninth Circuit has held that state law contract
claims which do not specifically fall within the categories of core pro-
ceedings enumerated in 28 U.S.C. section 157(b)(2)(B) through (N) are
related proceedings even if they fit within the general wording of the two
catch-all provisions. 2'
The fact that the constitutionality of the Emergency Rule has been
198. See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
199. See Danning v. Lummis (In re Tom Carter Enter., Inc.), 11 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2D
(MB) 1216, 1221 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
200. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (1984). See also supra notes 132-140 and accompanying text.
201. See K-Rom Constr. Corp. v. Behling (In re K-Rom Constr. Corp.), 46 Bankr. 745, 749
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Robinson Indus., Inc., 46 Bankr. 464, 465-66 (D. Mass.
1985); Cameron v. Anderson (In re American Energy Inc.), 50 Bankr. 175, 178-79 (D.N.D. 1985);
Morse Elec. Co. v. Logicon, Inc. (In re Morse Elec. Co.), 47 Bankr. 234 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
202. Taggert, supra note 183, at 248.
203. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). It is a cardinal principle that in construing a
statute a court should first ascertain whether a construction by which the constitutional question
may be avoided is fairly possible. Id.
204. See Piombo Corp. v. Castlerock Prop. (In re Castlerock Prop.), 781 F.2d 159, 162 (9th Cir.
1986). But see Harry C. Partridge, Jr. & Sons, Inc. v. M&R Constr. Corp. (In re Harry C. Partridge,
Jr. & Sons, Inc.), 48 Bankr. 1006, 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (state law contract claim characterized as
core proceeding where it fits the description of § 157(b)(2)(E) (1984), one of the specific provisions).
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sustained by every circuit court of appeals which has addressed the issue
is further support for the validity of both the core and non-core distinc-
tion and of the power of a bankruptcy judge in core proceedings.20 5 The
distinction between core and non-core, related, proceedings in the 1984
Amendments is a codification of the identical distinction drawn in the
Emergency Rule. 0 6 The only significant difference in the two systems is
a different standard of review in core matters. While the Emergency
Rule provided that in core matters a district court could hold its own
hearing and receive additional evidence,207 the 1984 Amendments give
the district courts only appellate authority over referred core matters,
using a clearly erroneous standard of review.208 However, this difference
is merely technical due to the power of the district court to withdraw any
proceeding at any time prior to the final decision by the bankruptcy
judge.20 9
Once the authority of a bankruptcy judge in core proceedings is un-
derstood as power regarding federal rights, little doubt remains about
the validity of the powers of the bankruptcy judges regarding non-core
proceedings.2"0 The identical authority of United States Magistrates to
hear and submit findings and conclusions to the district court was upheld
in United States v. Raddat. 211 In Raddatz, the district court had re-
ferred a criminal case to the magistrate for the purpose of conducting a
suppression hearing.212 The district court then made a de novo determi-
nation of the case without a further hearing.2 13 When the defendant
challenged the constitutionality of the Federal Magistrates Act, the
Supreme Court held that the Act suffered no Article III problems and
that it struck a proper balance between the demands of due process and
the constraints of Article III.214 The Court found great significance in its
conclusion that the entire process, including the decision to refer a mat-
ter to the magistrate, "takes place under the district court's total control
205. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
206. See 130 CONG. REc. H1846 (daily ed. March 21, 1984) (statements of Rep. Kastenmeier
that enactment of the Model Rule was the purpose of his amendment and that this was all that was
necessary to create a constitutional system). See also COLLIER ON BANK. I 3.01[1][b][vi] (15th ed.
1986).
207. COLLIER, supra note 206, at 3.01[l][bJ[vi](e)(2)(b).
208. See Danning, 11 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB) at 1222.
209. Id.
210. Carlson, supra note 187, at 2.
211. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 683 (1980).
212. Id. at 669.
213. Id. at 672.
214. Id. at 683-84.
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The powers of a magistrate are very similar to those of a bankruptcy
judge.2 16 Under the 1984 Amendments, as under the Magistrates Act,
the district court has the power to recall a referred proceeding at any
time.217 Further, the provision that a bankruptcy judge may make final
determination in non-core proceedings if the parties consent is similar to
the consent provision in the Magistrates Act.218 The Supreme Court has
yet to address the constitutional validity of the Magistrates Act's consent
provision, but each court of appeals to address the issue has upheld it.2" 9
There are two rationales for sustaining a consent provision under
the Magistrates Act or the 1984 Amendments. First, allowing parties to
consent to trial before an adjunct does not undermine the separation of
powers if the adjunct is part of the district court.22 Second, the district
judges have the power to refuse to permit the adjunct to try a particular
case, even if the parties consent. 22' These two aspects of the consent
provision assure that the district court retains the ultimate authority.
The question of whether consent must be express or may be implied
is really framed in the question of whether the failure to file a timely
motion of objection to a bankruptcy judge's determination of a matter as
a core proceeding is a procedural default which precludes a party from
raising the issue on appeal.22 2 It should be noted that even in the crimi-
nal arena, many substantive rights, including the constitutional right to a
jury trial, are lost when a litigant fails to follow procedural require-
ments.223 Furthermore, it is possible that such a procedural default does
not preclude the issue from being raised on appeal. The consent feature
will likely only be clarified as the issues arise in controversy.224 How-
ever, it appears that even if implied consent precludes raising an objec-
215. Id. at 681.
216. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. 1984) with 28 U.S.C. § 636 (Supp. 1981).
217. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (Supp. 1984) with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(6) (Supp. 1981).
218. Carlson, supra note 187, at 3. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (Supp. 1984) with 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c)(1) (Supp. 1981).
219. See Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic v. In-
stromedix, 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984); Wharton-Thomas v.
United States, 721 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1983).
220. Carlson, supra note 187, at 3.
221. Id.
222. Taggert, supra note 183, at 243-244.
223. See FED. I. Civ. P. 38.
224. See Norton & Lieb, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments,
1985 ANN. SURVEY BANKR. L. 53, 144 (1985); Interconnect Tel. Serv., Inc. v. Farren, 59 Bankr. 397
(N.D.N.Y. 1986). Noting the lack of case law on the consent issue, the district court relied on
Norton & Lieb in concluding that "section 157(c)(2) should be construed to apply only if express
consent is given." Id. But see Piombo, 781 F.2d at 164, where the Ninth Circuit adopted the concept
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tion on appeal, such a procedural default is consistent with approaches in
the law generally and in appellate practice.225
C. Withdrawal
The withdrawal authority given to the district courts226 over re-
ferred bankruptcy matters is the final safeguard which assures the direct
control and authority of the district courts over all bankruptcy proceed-
ings. The withdrawal authority is limited only in that it must be for
cause.227 There is every reason to expect that the showing of cause will
be satisfied any time a bankruptcy judge's authority over the matter in
228 hewihquestion raises constitutional concerns. The withdrawal provision also
protects parties from potential abuse of discretion by the bankruptcy
judge in the making of the initial core/non-core determination.229 Once
again, the Magistrates Act has been sustained on similar grounds.23 In
addition to the extensive Article III administrative control over the man-
agement, composition and operation of the magistrate system, the Ninth
Circuit, sitting en banc, found the district courts' power to recall cases on
their own initiative to be significant proof of district court control.231 It
must also be remembered that the reference of any and all cases and
proceedings is revocable at any time by the district court. Furthermore,
the correctness of any ruling of the bankruptcy judge may also be chal-
lenged on appeal.232
V. CONCLUSION
At first blush, the 1984 Amendments seem to create a jurisdictional
of implied consent and held that implied consent is a question of law to be reviewed de novo upon
appeal.
225. Taggart, supra note 183, at 244. Procedural default mechanisms are common in law. They
are based on the idea that failure to take action within a reasonable time indicates an intention not to
take that action. Two examples of procedural default mechanisms are statutes of limitations and
rules requiring appeals to be filed within specified time limits. In addition, it is a general rule that
objections not raised at the trial level are precluded from consideration on appeal.
226. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1984).
227. Id.
228. Because the district court retains jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters and the bankruptcy
judge is only an adjunct to the district court, it seems likely that a district judge's concern over a
bankruptcy judge's unconstitutional usurpation of judicial power would be grounds for withdrawal
of a matter back to the district court.
229. See Danning v. Lummis (In re Tom Carter Enter.), I 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB)
1216, 1221 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
230. Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic v. Instromedix, 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984) (en bane), cert,
denied, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984).
231. Id. at 544.
232. The appeal procedures for bankruptcy matters are found in 28 U.S.C. § 158 (1984).
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quagmire. They appear to establish the same type of confusing bifur-
cated bankruptcy system Congress was trying to avoid by giving the
bankruptcy court pervasive jurisdiction in the 1978 Act. As many critics
of the 1984 Amendments argue, establishing bankruptcy judges as Arti-
cle III judges may have been a far simpler cure for the constitutional
infirmities of the bankruptcy system under the 1978 Act.233 However,
Congress chose not to give the bankruptcy judges Article III powers and
protections, and to say that this would have been a simpler solution does
not imply that a more complex solution is unconstitutional.
The fact that the Supreme Court has declined to hear any controver-
sies regarding the constitutionality of the bankruptcy system since Mara-
thon may be an indication that a majority of the Supreme Court Justices
are satisfied with the constitutionality of the current bankruptcy system.
It should be remembered that the concurring opinion defines and limits
the scope of the Marathon decision.
However, because the short concurring opinion was expressly lim-
ited to the narrow facts of the case, it is impossible to predict how much
of the plurality's reasoning the concurring Justices would accept. The
1984 Amendments should be declared constitutional by the Supreme
Court if the following conditions are met. First, the concurring Justices
must agree with the plurality opinion that the purely state law issue was
the only constitutional defect in the 1978 Act. Second, the concurring
Justices must agree with the plurality opinion that bankruptcy adjudica-
tions and the adjustment of debtor-creditor relations are matters of fed-
eral law. Finally, the concurring Justices must agree with the plurality
opinion that adjuncts to Article III courts have wide latitude to adjudi-
cate federal law matters.
Much of the jurisdictional confusion disappears once it is clear that
the 1984 Amendments establish bankruptcy judges as adjuncts to the Ar-
ticle III district courts. The structure of the new bankruptcy system fol-
lows an adjunct rationale supported by both the Marathon decision and
the Magistrates Act. Although it has not been reviewed by the Supreme
Court, the constitutionality of the new system has been upheld in princi-
ple by several circuits when the identical concept was first introduced
under the Emergency Rule.
Pursuant to the Marathon plurality mandate, the new system distin-
guishes between the broad authority of an adjunct regarding congressio-
233. For detailed arguments both supporting and refuting this proposition, see R. DEMAscio,
WM. NoRTON & R. LIEB, supra note 4.
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nally created rights and the very limited powers of an adjunct regarding
non-congressionally created rights. The definitions of core and non-core
proceedings follow traditional Supreme Court logic concerning what is
and what is not a federal right.
Some of the language in the procedures section of the 1984 Amend-
ments is admittedly broad. However, in the years since the Emergency
Rule was first introduced, bankruptcy decisions have narrowed and fur-
ther defined many of the terms of art used in the 1984 Amendments.
This judicial narrowing of statutory language, specifically, of what is a
core proceeding, has helped clarify congressional intent. As in many
other areas of law, judicial interpretation has also strengthened the con-
stitutionality of the statutes. Judges have defined core proceedings in
such a way to ensure that the 1984 Amendments fall within the require-
ments of Marathon and of the Constitution. Therefore, the adjunct sys-
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